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 ABSTRACT 
 
Liquidity is an increasingly significant issue that fund managers pay vigorous attention 
to.  While the pervious literature focuses on the mutual fund liquidity management and 
various other liquidity tools, the determinants and implications of credit lines are not 
well understood. This study examines the effects of monitoring mechanism, sales 
restrictions of funds and the financial crisis on funds’ participation in the line of 
credits. Our results also show that credit lines have significant impact on funds’ cash 
holdings and therefore is a good substitution of line funds’ cash holdings. We also 
examine the flow-performance sensitivity of funds after using credit lines. The credit 
lines would reduce the capital flow in the next period but not weaken the flow-
performance sensitivity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Liquidity is an increasingly significant issue that funds managers pay vigorous 
attention to.  First, funds claim they are more liquid than their underlying assets and 
make the so-called liquidity transformation - liquid claims backed by illiquid assets - 
happen (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016). As a result, the promise of liquidity helps 
funds attract investors. Second, illiquid funds are more likely to face with the run-like 
behaviors of investors and therefore causes financial instability problems - this is true 
for both illiquid equity funds (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010) and illiquid corporate 
bond funds (Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng, 2017). Moreover, mutual funds provide more 
liquidity to those investors who redeem their capital first, which motivate investors 
withdraw their investments in the early stage to gain the “first-move advantage”. This 
phenomenon is especially common when the funds perform badly, i.e. when the return 
is negative. Third, holding liquidity enables managers to make quick decisions when 
encountering new investment opportunities in high quality underlying assets. Funds 
that hold high abnormal cash outperform their low-cash-holding counterparts by over 
2% a year (Simutin, 2013). 
 
However, holding liquidity can cause several problems. One of the concerns is 
sometimes holding cash means the capital is not fully invested in the most efficient 
area (Liu and Mello, 2011). So, fund managers usually explore alternative liquidity 
tools, such as interfund lending (Agarwal Zhao, 2018), asset-backed commercial paper 
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money market mutual fund liquidity facility (Duygan-Bump et al, 2013). Previous 
literature focuses on the usage and implications of various liquidity tools. However, 
the research on line of credit is very few. In this paper, we extend the study to line of 
credit, which is a short-term cash loan provided to funds that can be easily withdraw 
when needed. If funds participate in the line of credit, it might need to pay a 
committee fee to the financial institution, unless the fund meets certain qualification 
for a waiver. The interests of credit lines are only paid after the actual withdrawal 
happened.  
 
In a similar vein with the mechanism of cash holdings, using line of credit 
could bring about a lot of advantages. As a source of short-term loan, credit lines 
could guarantee outflows of various purpose. Having the assurance provided by credit 
lines, fund managers do not have to worry about the potential cost of sale fire. 
Moreover, compared with cash holdings, using line of credit additionally improves the 
efficiency of capital allocation as it does not occupy the capital that could have 
allocated to more profitable targets. As a result, it mitigates the hard balance between 
liquidity needs and profitable purpose of funds. 
 
We addressed the following questions in our study: 1) What are the 
motivations of participating in the line of credit? 2) What fund characteristics are 
important to determine the participation of line of credit? 3) Could credit line be a 
good substitution of cash holdings? 4) To what extend that credit line affect funds’ 
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cash holding? 5) How would it affect the relationship between fund capital flow and 
fund performance?   
 
First, we examine the determinants of funds’ decision on participation in line 
of credits. We consider funds with good monitoring mechanism and strict sales 
restrictions more likely to be financially stable. Therefore, those funds would face less 
run-like behavior and therefore use credit lines less. Also, we find that funds are more 
likely to use line of credit during the financial crisis in 2007-2009. 
 
Then we focus on the implications of line of credits. One of the things we start 
with is the relationship between funds’ cash holding and line of credit. We think the 
line of credit could relieve the pressure of potential investors’ redemption and 
therefore reduce the need for funds to hold too much cash in their accounts. The 
results suggest that line of credit contributes to reducing the liquidity burden of funds. 
The other thing we pay attention to is the change happened to flow-performance 
sensitivity after using line of credits. We find that the impacts of performance on fund 
capital flows are stronger for negative-return funds than that of positive-return funds. 
However, for both good and bad-performed fund, the increase of return would 
increase the investment for the funds. And it is also true for both institutional funds 
and retail funds. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspect. First, the data we use 
is hand-collected from the filings of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions. We 
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are the first to use the exact amount of credit lines rather than the action itself. This 
provide our readers a new aspect to consider the liquidity tools. Second, while there 
are literature focuses on other liquidity tools of funds, we extend the analysis to line of 
credit.  
 
1.1 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Two things are profoundly significant regarding to the research on line of 
credit. The first one is the specific characteristics that would determine the funds’ 
decision on participation in and usage of line of credit. The other one is the 
implications on fund after using the line of credit. In order to solve the problems, we 
derive the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: a) Funds with better monitoring mechanisms, stricter sales restrictions 
are less likely to participate in the credit lines than their peers. b) During the time of 
financial crisis, funds are more likely to use credit lines than other periods. 
 
Our first hypothesis is regarding to the determinants of line of credits. In our 
definition, the monitoring mechanism mainly contains two elements. The first is the 
rear load fee that funds charge to their investors. The back-end load is a fee that 
investors need to pay when redeeming their mutual fund shares. It is a percentage of 
the share that being sold related to fund policies. However, there are also some 
actively managed so-called “no load” funds that charge zero sales cost on their 
investors. And Malkiel (2013) suggests that the fee is a positive sign that the funds 
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have good management and performance. In another words, back-end load fee makes 
it harder for investors to redeem their investment and therefore make them to provide 
better monitoring over the funds. 
 
Then we consider institutional funds to be more likely to have better 
monitoring mechanism compared with their retail peers. Institutional investors can be 
more sensitive to high fees and bad risk-adjusted performance. On average, an 
institutional fund outperformed its retail peers – with the same manager and similar 
strategy – by 1.5% (Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012). Therefore, we think institutional 
funds are less likely to need to use the line of credit. 
 
In the non-crisis period, holding illiquid assets could bring about a so-called 
illiquidity premium to funds, while in the crisis period the premium would turn to be 
discount (Schaub and Schmid, 2012). During the crisis time, fund with low liquidity 
would have low returns. In order to increase the liquidity during crisis time, funds are 
more likely to need the line of credits.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Funds would hold less cash after participating in line of credit. 
 
Funds with liquidity can react quickly to new investment chance and investors’ 
redemption and therefore avoid the cost of sale fire. However, some researchers 
concern that the holding cash would cause financial instability problem and reduce the 
efficiency of investment capital. Using line of credit is a good way to solve the 
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disadvantages of holding cash because it does not squeeze the capital budget for other 
investment opportunities.   
 
Hypothesis 3: a) Funds’ performance and application of line of credit would affect the 
funds capital flow. b) Capital flow is more sensitive to performance for funds with 
negative returns, compared to that of its positive-return counterparts. c) Using credit 
lines would weaken the flow-performance relation of funds. 
 
For both corporate bond funds and equity funds, the impact of good and bad 
performance on capital flow is asymmetry (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010; 
Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng, 2017). The investors are more sensitive when the funds 
perform badly because they are eager to redeem their money from the fund once the 
performance worsens. Therefore, a decrease in return for bad funds are more likely to 
lead to a strong capital outflow. Also, we think using line of credit would mitigate the 
run-like behavior and thus weaken the investors’ sensitivity to the funds’ performance. 
 
While the line of credit provides funds with liquidity, investors can withdraw 
their capital readily when the funds have access to credit lines. Since the actively-
managed institutional investors have better monitoring mechanism, it is more 
convenient for them to react according to funds’ performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA 
 
We gathered two datasets on mutual funds from 1995 to 2016. The first one 
from SEC filings shows how funds participate in line of credits. The second dataset is 
collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), covering 
comprehensive information on mutual funds. This enables us to analyze the 
determinants and implication of funds’ borrowing behavior. Details on the datasets are 
provided below.  
 
2.1 Line of Credits Data  
Funds’ participation in the line of credits are for short-term liquidity purposes, 
such as shareholder redemptions. For funds that has applied for the line of credits, 
there are mainly two cases in its utilization. First, some funds would not make any 
borrowing during the reporting period because there is no such need. For instance, 
Dreyfus Institutional U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund participated in a $100 million 
unsecured line of credit but did not used it during the first half of 2003. Second, they 
may participate in the redemption credit facility and pay the interest based on 
prevailing market rates. For example, Dreyfus Disciplined Stock Fund, a separate 
diversified series of the Dreyfus Funds, participates with other Dreyfus-managed 
funds in a $500 million redemption credit facility. In the contract, the fund decided to 
pay the commitment fees on its portion of facility. During the period, the fund used 
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daily amount of borrowing of first half of 2003 was about $205,500, and the weighted 
average annualized interest rate is 1.68%. 
We manually collected data on funds’ line of credits from SEC company 
filings (Forms N-30D, N-CSRS and N-CSR, specifically). Using “line of credit”, “line 
of credits” and “credit lines” as key words, we searched all the fund filings between 
1995 and 2016 and manually recorded the amount they borrowed, the interest rate 
quoted, the interests they paid and the day outstanding. We also recorded the summary 
information of the filing, such as trust names, fund names, file dates and report dates. 
We later used them as keys to merge with mutual fund data from CRSP. Since the 
financial filings are reported half-yearly, this is also the time interval for the dataset. 
We have 21,563 observations in the dataset, covering the filings of 5371 funds1. 
During the recorded period, there are 5,157 borrowing behaviors in total, with an 
average loan balance of $8.7m. The weighted average interest rate is 2.64%, and the 
average interest amount is $27,287.  
 
Figure 1 shows all funds’ total number of applications for line of credits and 
the total amount of credit lines used from 1995 to 2016. We find that both numbers 
increase significantly overtime. Since the first applications in mid 1990s, the number 
of applications increased steadily to its peak at 330 in 2010, and then drop to around 
250 in later years. The total amount of credits used increased from below $300m in the 
late 1990s to $1.5b in 2016, with large fluctuations over the years. The average 
amount of one borrowing behavior for each year fluctuates between $2.5m to $7.33m 
                                                 
1 If a fund borrows through line of credit in a given time period, all its peer funds in the same family 
will appear in our dataset. 
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without a clear pattern over time. Our data suggests that it has become increasingly 
popular among funds to participate in line of credit in the past two decades. 
 
Figure 1 Total Number of Applications and Total Amount Used (1995-2016) 
 
 
 
2.2 Mutual Fund Data 
We downloaded 4 datasets from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and incorporated them using time and CRSP fund number2 as keys. We collected 
monthly data on fund summary, return and dividend, covering the same period as SEC 
filings from 1995 to 2016. Fund summary includes fundamental information such as 
net asset value, maturities, amount of fund invested in different categories (stocks, 
bonds, other securities and cash), as well as fund characteristics (whether the fund is 
                                                 
2 CRSP Fund Number is a specific identifier CRSP database gives to every fund. 
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money market fund, ETF or ETN, dead or not). The dataset also includes control 
variables such as funds’ expense ratio, size and cash holdings. Additionally, we 
collected funds’ rear-load strategy with their beginning and end dates.  
 
To prepare for the merging with SEC filings, we reconstructed all CRSP 
datasets into half-yearly: for monthly datasets, we keep data from the last available 
month in each half year; for the rear-load dataset, we expand the observations to half-
yearly and create a dummy variable, assigning value 1 if a fund used any rear-load 
strategy for at least one month in a given half year. 
 
 
2.3 Data Construction 
In order to merge datasets from two sources, we match each line-of-credit 
application in the SEC filings to CRSP by their trust and fund name. To do this, in 
both datasets, we created unique lists of trust-fund name by concatenating the trust 
name and the fund name - there are 5,371 unique trust-fund names in the SEC dataset 
and 48,347 in CRSP. Unfortunately, there are only 1,928 funds that has identical trust 
and fund names in both datasets. For funds without an exact match, we use 
Levenshtein distance as a string metric to find the closest match in CRSP. Trust-fund 
names in the SEC dataset are matched with their counterparts in CRSP with minimal 
distance, and the match is manually selected in case there is a tie. Additionally, we 
inspect matches that has a minimal distance of 10 or greater or if only less than 80% of 
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the length is matched. As a result, we can match an additional 2,163 trust-fund names, 
with 4,091 out of 5,371 names matched in total. 
 
Then, we used this map to merge with both Edgar data and CRSP data 
respectively to get our final data sample. When merging with SEC data using map, we 
matched 17,234 observations and lost 3,965 of them. In another word, for these 3,965 
observations in Edgar dataset, we could not find the exact match in CRSP dataset. 
Then we analyzed the two samples, the matched sample and the unmatched sample, to 
make sure there is no significant difference in the characteristic of the two sample so 
that there is no bias created by dropping the 3,965 observations.  
 
Figure 2 Percentage of Borrowing Case for Both Samples (1995-2016) 
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Figure 3 Percentage of Borrowing Case for Both Samples (Two Time Periods) 
 
 
From Figures 2 and 3, we observed that both matched and unmatched sample 
shows similar trend in density. The number of lines of credit used increased first 
between 1995 and 2011 and then slightly dropped after 2011. If we use the year of 
2005 as a cutting point and smoothed the line by 3-year period, it is easy to find that 
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the trends of both samples are very similar. From this perspective, we think the 
matched sample we used is unbiased. However, we will consider the observations 
before 2005 and after 2005 as different subsamples and conduct separate analysis for 
both subsamples. The resulting dataset contains 1,013,909 half-yearly fund 
observations.  
 
2.4 Variables Construction 
2.4.1 Measures of fund flows 
We use the percentage of change in Total Net Asset in the given half year as 
the measure of funds’ flow in that period: 
Flow𝑡,𝑛 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑡,𝑛 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑡−1,𝑛(1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡−1,𝑛)
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑡−1,𝑛
 
where n denotes the fund and t denotes the half year. We winsorized top and 
bottom 5%. 
 
2.4.2 Measures of line of credit 
We use two ways to measure funds’ application and participation of line of 
credit. The first measure is a dummy variable cl, with 1 denoting that the funds have 
used the line of credits in a given half year and 0 otherwise. Specifically, we deem that 
a fund had used the line of credits during the reporting period if we find at least one of 
the following information in the SEC records: loan balance, interest amount, interest 
rate and day outstanding.  
14 
 
Moreover, our study also focused on the amount of the line of credits that 
funds used – this is defined as cl_amount, denoting the loan balance of line of credits. 
We winsorized top and bottom 5% of cl_amount to rid the variable of extreme values. 
 
2.4.3 Measure of monitoring mechanisms 
We used two ways to estimate whether the funds have efficient monitoring 
mechanisms, inst and load_dum. The first variable took value 1 if it is an institutional 
fund and 0 otherwise (which means it is a retail fund). We consider the institutional 
funds have better monitoring mechanisms due to their better management, more strict 
rules, and more independent boards.  
The second measure load_dum took value 1 if the funds charged rear load fee 
to their investors and 0 if not. If the funds charge the back-end fee to their investors, 
then it cost more for investors to redeem their shares. Consequently, they will look 
closely at the funds to make sure it is in good condition. Therefore, we regard back-
end fee as an indicator for external monitoring. 
 
2.4.4 Variable for the financial crisis 
At the time of financial crisis, the funds are more likely to need liquidities to 
deal with investors’ redemption. We generated a variable timing that equals 1 if the 
reporting period is in the financial crisis and 0 otherwise. We set the financial crisis 
period from first half of 2008 to second half of 2009. 
 
2.4.5 Measure of sales restrictions 
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If the funds have sales restrictions, it might be more stables on the demand of 
redemption. We generated a variable called sales, which equals 1 if the fund is affinity 
or employee-only fund and 0 otherwise. 
 
2.4.6 Control variables 
Besides flow, we defined three more control variables, expr, turnr, and size, 
each denoting the expense ratio, the turnover ratio and the logarithm value of total net 
assets in the latest reporting period. 
 
The summary statistics for all the variables we discussed above are presented 
in table 1.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Line of Credit 
     
cl 542,834 0.006 0.077872 0 1 
cl_amount 3,312 2,993,403 19,400,000 0 454,000,000 
      
Liquidity 
     
cash 483,319 3.252 4.767 -1.15 18.4 
      
Characteristic of Funds 
inst 537,382 0.375 0.484 0 1 
load_dum 542,834 0.132 0.338 0 1 
sales 542,834 0.003 0.056 0 1 
timing 542,834 0.190 0.392 0 1 
      
Control 
     
expr 455,327 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.024 
turnr 450,208 0.747 0.632 0.07 2.45 
size 530,717 3.166 2.744 -4.60 12.32 
flow 485,856 0.107 0.357 -0.36 1.172 
 
The average loan amount of credit lines is 2,993,403 with a maximum of 
454,000,000. The cash that funds hold averaged at $3.25m and peaked at $18.4m. And 
if the funds have very short-term borrowings, the number dropped to negative with a 
minimum of -$1.15m. The average value for expense ratio, turnover ratio, size and 
flow of the funds are 1.31%, 74.80%, $3.16M and 10.76% respectively.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Determinants of participation in line of credit 
We first identified the determinants of line of credit. We used the cl variable as 
dependent variable and funds’ characteristics as independent variables. The impacts on 
the possibility of using line of credit is estimated as follows. 
CL𝑡,𝑛 = 𝛼 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛾 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛿𝑋𝑡,𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡.𝑛 
Where t denotes the time, n denotes the fund and X denotes the controls. 
Monitoring represents the monitoring mechanism, restrictions refer to sales 
restrictions and X contains four controls variables, namely expense ratio, turnover 
ratio, capital flow and size. In all the regressions, we included inst, load_dum, sales as 
independent variables. In regression (1) and (3), we also used the dummy variable of 
timing. Because the sample time period of (1) and (3) includes 2008-2009, we didn’t 
use half-year time fixed effects to control for the impact of unobservable changes 
happened in different years.  
Table 2 reports the estimated results of the equation above. The result (1) 
suggest that the possibility of using line of credits is negatively related to the 
monitoring mechanism and sales restrictions. Besides, during financial crisis period, 
funds are more likely to use line of credit. The parameter shows that if the funds are 
institutional, the possibility of using line of credit would decrease by 0.49 percent. The 
impact is significantly negative. If a fund is an institutional fund, it might be more 
stable in capital so that it does not need to use the line of credit. For the rear load fee, 
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it would reduce the possibility of credit lines by 0.20 percent. It is because if funds 
charge rear load fees to their investor, it would be harder for the investors to withdraw 
their money. So, the funds don’t need to ask for much credit lines from the bank. At a 
similar vein, the rule of sales restriction would decrease the possibility by 0.95 percent. 
If the funds have sales restrictions, it would enjoy higher level of capital stability and 
therefore the funds don’t require much liquidity.  Because the effect of financial crisis 
is insignificant, looking into the coefficient is meaningless. However, the sign is 
positive as we expected.  
 
In result (2) we report the estimation after adding time fixed effect to the full 
sample. We observe that the institutional feature would have a stronger influence on 
funds’ usage of credit lines. And the effect of rear load and sales restrictions decreased 
by 0.0009 percent and 0.0072 percent. The funds’ characteristics still have similar 
impact on the dependent variables. Because we added the time fixed effect in the 
analysis, we excluded the timing variable out from the original equation (1). And the 
same things happened for (5) and (6).  
 
In order to do the robustness check, we decided to construct two subsamples, 
one contains observations before 2005 and the other after 2005. The result (3) and (4) 
are using the subsample after 2005 and (5) and (6) used the one before 2005. And we 
added time fixed effect to (4) and (6). We observed that for the subsample before 2005, 
institutional feature has stronger effects, but load fee and sales restrictions have a 
weaker impact on the dependent variable, compared with the subsample after 2005. 
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As for the result for those controls we used, it turned out to have significant 
effects on the dependent variable as we expected before. An increase in expense ratio 
and capital flows and a decrease in turnover ratio and capital size would all decrease 
the possibility of line of credit. When the expense ratio increases 100%, the possibility 
of line of credit would decrease by 23.5 percent. If the capital flow increased 100%, 
the possibility of line of credit would decrease by 0.28 percent. Besides, the 
coefficient for turnover ratio and size are 0.0012 and 0.0011 respectively, meaning an 
100% increase in expense ratio and $1M in capital size would increase the possibility 
by 0.12 and 0.11 percent. 
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Table 2 Determinants of Line of Credits 
Dependent Variable: cl (=1 if the fund used line of credit) 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
1995-2016 
(2) 
1995-2016 
(3) 
2005-2016 
(4) 
2005-2016 
(5) 
1995-2005 
(6) 
1995-2005 
Characteristics of funds      
inst +/- -0.00488*** -0.00504*** -0.00553*** -0.00549*** -0.00241*** -0.00252*** 
  (0.000284) (0.000285) (0.000318) (0.000319) (0.000543) (0.000543) 
load_dum - -0.00205*** -0.00194*** -0.00196*** -0.00193*** -0.00203*** -0.00210*** 
  (0.000347) (0.000348) (0.000407) (0.000408) (0.000524) (0.000524) 
sales - -0.00951*** -0.00879*** -0.0117*** -0.0115*** -0.00430 -0.00421 
  (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00251) (0.00251) (0.00238) (0.00238) 
timing + 0.000583  -0.000195    
  (0.000300)  (0.000321)    
        
Controls        
expr - -0.235*** -0.202*** -0.241*** -0.236*** -0.0589 -0.0620 
  (0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0290) (0.0292) (0.0459) (0.0459) 
turnr + 0.00116*** 0.00137*** 0.00153*** 0.00153*** 0.000743* 0.000829** 
  (0.000196) (0.000197) (0.000231) (0.000231) (0.000304) (0.000305) 
size + 0.00109*** 0.00114*** 0.00125*** 0.00127*** 0.000396*** 0.000396*** 
  (0.0000475) (0.0000479) (0.0000533) (0.0000536) (0.0000912) (0.0000914) 
flow - -0.00278*** -0.00279*** -0.00306*** -0.00319*** -0.00156** -0.00166** 
  (0.000338) (0.000352) (0.000390) (0.000406) (0.000557) (0.000576) 
cons  0.00679*** 0.00620*** 0.00710*** 0.00693*** 0.00364*** 0.00366*** 
  (0.000489) (0.000491) (0.000546) (0.000547) (0.000965) (0.000965) 
df_m  8 7 8 7 7 7 
Time FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N   422556 422556 351683 351683 89993 89993 
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Then we used the cl_amount variable as dependent variable and funds’ characteristics 
as independent variables, estimating independent variables’ impact on the loan balance 
amount of line of credit. As a result, the full sample we used are observations with 
loan balance in our dataset. Because there are only very few funds used both line of 
credit and sales restrictions, we excluded this dependent variable from the equation. 
We used the formula as following: 
CL_Amount𝑡,𝑛 = 𝛼 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛾 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛿𝑋𝑡,𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡.𝑛 
Where t denotes the time and n denotes the fund. Because there are very few 
observations before 2005 (the sample size is just about 200 observations), we only 
analyzed the full sample and subsample after 2005. These regressions show similar 
results of these variables with the last regressions. Result (1) suggests that institutional 
feature and load fee are negatively related to the loan balance and the timing’s effect is 
positive. If funds are institutional funds, their loan balance would decrease by $336K. 
If the funds charge back-end fee to their investors, the loan balance would decrease by 
$4M. During the time of financial crisis, funds increase their loan balance by $297K 
compared with other years. However, the effect of institutional feature and timing is 
not significant on 95% level. 
 
In result (2), we added the fixed effect of time and therefore exclude timing 
variable from the equation. We noticed that the institutional feature would have a 
weaker influence and load fee would have a slightly stronger effect compared with 
result (1), which are $283K and $4.2M, respectively. 
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In equation (3) and (4), we used the subsample after 2005. They do show a 
stronger effect of institutional features and load fee. But the impact of institutional 
feature and timing is still insignificant. 
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Table 3 Determinants of Loan Balance Amount 
Dependent Variable: cl_amount (amount of loan balance) 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
1995-2016 
(2) 
1995-2016 
(3) 
2005-2016 
(4) 
2005-2016 
Characteristics of Funds 
inst +/- -336443.9 -283033.4 -495248.3 -454975 
  -1163005.2 -1195513.1 -1260243.9 -1293792.8 
load_dum - -4027838.7** -4184663.7** -4734275.4** -4872401.8** 
  -1528922.2 -1541556.9 -1702007 -1711437.2 
timing + 297132.8  198507.8  
  -1118500.8  -1188631.5  
      
Controls      
expr - 397775993.1*** 428483161.2*** 481540832.7*** 506353735.6*** 
  -109006422.5 -111432626.5 -122289676.5 -123935276.5 
turnr + -2162565.1** -2234547.7** -2327638.2** -2462354.6** 
  -756243.8 -770136.8 -845452.1 -853844.7 
size + 1227129.5*** 1282931.7*** 1399119.8*** 1459108.9*** 
  -234721 -239634.6 -262418.7 -266912.5 
flow - -2351566.3 -1637493.3 -2460968 -1690316.4 
  -1672540.9 -1854329.4 -1894628.8 -2108834 
cons  -5063923.5* -5607083.7* -6510481.1** -6971334.5** 
  -2265898.6 -2322852 -2514497.7 -2565566.9 
df_m  7 6 7 6 
Time FE  No Yes No Yes 
N   2469 2469 2234 2234 
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3.2 IMPLICATIONS 
3.2.1 Liquidity 
We are also interested in the implications of line of credit. First, we focus on 
its impacts on liquidity. We used the cash holding as a proxy for funds’ liquidity in 
this analysis and then used the cash holdings of next year as the dependent variable of 
the regression. Then we used the dummy variable cl of current year as dependent 
variable and use the timing variable as controls. The equation is as follows: 
Cash𝑡+1,𝑛 = 𝛼 𝐶𝐿𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡.𝑛 
Where t denotes the time and n denotes the fund. Table 3 summarized the OLS 
regression result for the impact. (1) and (2) used the full sample, while (3), (4) used 
the subsample after 2005 and (5), (6) used the other subsample. We also added time 
fixed effect to (2), (4), (6). All the results show that line of credit have a significant 
negative effect on liquidity represented by cash holdings. (1) suggests that the usage of 
line of credit would decrease the $0.523M for the full sample. Compared to the full 
sample, (3) finds a slightly weaker impact of $0.495M after 2005 and (5) gives a 
stronger effect of $0.944M before 2005. All the result after adding the fixed effect 
shows a slightly weaker effect than that of not doing so. When funds have line of 
credit, they would expect less liquidity in the future year because they don’t need to 
prepare much for investor redemption. As a result, they would hold significantly less 
cash in their account. 
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During the year of financial crisis, funds still need to hold more cash in their 
hand. For the full sample, during the crisis funds hold $0.1M more than the normal 
time. For the subsample after 2005, the number would be $0.16M.  
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Table 4 Implications on Liquidity of Line of Credits 
Dependent Variable: Cash holdings 
  
Predict
ed Sign 
(1) 
1995-2016 
(2) 
1995-2016 
(3) 
2005-2016 
(4) 
2005-2016 
(5) 
1995-2005 
(6) 
1995-2005 
cl - -0.523*** -0.481*** -0.495*** -0.476*** -0.944*** -0.883** 
  (0.0863) (0.0860) (0.0891) (0.0889) (0.286) (0.285) 
        
Controls        
timing + 0.103***  0.160***    
  (0.0170)  (0.0173)    
cons  3.198*** 3.220*** 3.141*** 3.179*** 3.498*** 3.498*** 
  (0.00792) (0.00699) (0.00850) (0.00740) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
df_m  2 1 2 1 1 1 
Time FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N   456961 456961 413881 413881 62896 62896 
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3.2.2 Flow-performance Relationship 
Then we began to analyze the impacts of credit lines on flow-performance 
relationship. We used flow of next period as dependent variables. Because we believe 
the funds with good and bad performance will have different relationship with its 
performance, we generated two new variables, perfpos and perfneg, to indicate the 
funds’ return of last month with positive return and negative return, respectively. The 
equation we used is as follows:  
 
Flow𝑡+1,𝑛 = 𝛼 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡,𝑛 + 𝛾 𝑐𝑙𝑡,𝑛 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡.𝑛 
 
where t denotes the time and n denotes the fund. Besides, 𝑋  is the control 
variables, including cash holding (representing the liquidity level) and 𝜔 is the half-
yearly fixed effects. Table 5 reports the results of regressions in the question above. 
(1) used the full sample of 1995-2016. We observed that one percent increase in 
funds’ positive performance will increase the funds’ flow by 0.585 percent. Also, one 
percent increase in funds’ negative performance will increase the funds’ flow by 0.715 
percent. This shows that while the performance of funds improves, it will be more 
attractive to investors and therefore induce inflows. Moreover, the effects of good and 
bad funds’ performance are asymmetric as the results showed. This is economically 
meaningful, with the similar vein of Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010). The effect of 
bad performance is stronger because bad (negative) return would lead to a situation 
that investors are more likely to redeem their capital. The effect of line of credits on 
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capital flow is negative. If a fund used credit lines, its flow of next period would 
decrease by 6.79%.  
 
We expected that after the usage of credit lines, the flow-performance 
sensitivity would be weakened. Although the negative sign of both interaction terms 
confirmed our hypothesis, the result is not significant at 95% level. 
 
(2) and (3) used subsample after and before 2005, respectively. We observed 
very similar result for the subsample after 2005. However, we also found the effects of 
perneg and cl are both insignificant in the period of 1995-2005. This might be because 
the number of observations before 2005 is too few to show a clear trend. 
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Table 5 Flow-performance Sensitivity and the Relationship with Credit lines (Full 
Sample) 
                         Dependent Variable: flow of next period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1995-2016 2005-2016 1995-2005 
perfpos 0.585*** 0.418*** 2.273*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0340) (0.111) 
perfneg 0.715*** 0.758*** -0.320 
 (0.0349) (0.0353) (0.213) 
cl -0.0679*** -0.0704*** 0.00917 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0657) 
cash 0.00210*** 0.00161*** 0.00841*** 
 (0.000110) (0.000114) (0.000427) 
cl*perfneg -0.122 -0.0503 -1.210 
 (0.326) (0.334) (1.484) 
cl*perfpos -0.140 -0.0255 -2.020 
 (0.272) (0.282) (1.177) 
cons 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.0603*** 
 (0.000936) (0.000957) (0.00414) 
df_m 7 7 7 
Time FE YES YES YES 
N 430218 395241 34977 
 
Also, we used the subsample of institutional funds to find the different effects 
of determinants of flow for various investment sources. We expected different 
investors would be aware of the effect of line of credits. However, the result shows 
that the institutional investors are more complex (e.g., Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012) 
and thus have stronger reaction to the usage of credit lines. Table 6 reports the result 
for institutional funds and retail funds. For the institutional funds, after the usage of 
credit lines, the flow will decrease by 12.4%. For their retail counterparts, the number 
would be 3.92%. The outflows of institutional funds would be about 3 times of the 
number of retail funds.  
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The effects of institutional funds’ performance are very asymmetric while that 
of retail funds are very close. The coefficient of perfpos and perfneg for institutional 
funds are 0.292 and 0.613, the effects of bad performance is almost 2 times of that of 
good performance. However, for the retail funds, the coefficient is 0.744 and 0.840 
respectively. This showed that for retail investors, it is easier for them to invest in or 
withdraw from the funds and the inflows and outflows are not strongly affected by the 
fact whether the funds perform well or not.  
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Table 6  Flow-performance Sensitivity and the Relationship with Credit lines 
(Institutional and Retail Funds Flow) 
Dependent Variable: flow of next period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1995-2016 2005-2016 1995-2005 
Institutional   
perfpos 0.292*** 0.205*** 2.020*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0557) (0.251) 
perfneg 0.613*** 0.638*** -1.560* 
 (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.611) 
cl -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.101 
 (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0846) 
cash 0.000940*** 0.000570** 0.00866*** 
 (0.000201) (0.000205) (0.000964) 
_cons 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.104*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00939) 
N 167647 158435 9212 
 
   
Retail    
perfpos 0.744*** 0.531*** 2.289*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0418) (0.121) 
perfneg 0.840*** 0.906*** -0.205 
 (0.0441) (0.0448) (0.220) 
cl -0.0392*** -0.0379*** -0.0720* 
 (0.00664) (0.00675) (0.0320) 
cash 0.00339*** 0.00291*** 0.00846*** 
 (0.000126) (0.000131) (0.000468) 
_cons 0.0662*** 0.0667*** 0.0457*** 
 (0.00114) (0.00117) (0.00452) 
N 262564 236803 25761 
df_m 4 4 4 
Time FE YES YES YES 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
The liquidity issue of mutual fund is gaining attentions. While holding 
liquidity brings about a series of benefits to mutual funds, some researchers argue that 
holding too much cash reduces the efficiency of investment. In order to enjoy the 
benefits and mitigate the costs, we explore the rationale of line of credits.  
 
We find that fund characteristics such as monitoring system and sales 
restrictions as well as macroeconomic environment will both influence the funds’ 
decision on participating in the line of credit. Funds with better monitoring system, 
stricter sales restriction are less likely to apply for credit lines. Moreover, funds facing 
financial crisis are more likely to use credit lines, although the result is not significant 
on 95% level. 
 
For the implications of using line of credit, we measure two aspects of 
potential influence. First, we focus on the substitutional effect of credit lines on cash 
holding. Empirical evidence shows that participating in the line of credits would 
significantly reduce the cash holding for mutual fund in the next time period. Then we 
examine the flow-performance relationship. We confirmed that the negative-return 
funds’ capital flows are more likely influenced by the change in funds’ performance. 
Using credit lines would reduce the capital inflow of funds. However, there is no 
33 
 
strong evidences show that the decision on credit lines would weaken the flow-
performance sensitivity in our sample. 
 
This paper serves as one leg of the benefit-cost analysis on funds’ use of credit 
lines. Given the availability of data and limited time, we could not uncover the cost 
side of the instrument, which is left for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
In Table 7, we used the logarithm of loan balance amount as dependent 
variable instead of the simple amount. However, the result we got is not perfectly 
matched what we expected before. We listed the results in the next page. 
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Table 7 Determinants of Loan Balance Amount 
Dependent Variable: logarithm of cl_amount (amount of loan balance) 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
1995-2016 
(2) 
1995-2016 
(3) 
2005-2016 
(4) 
2005-2016 
Characteristics of Funds 
inst +/- 0.823*** 0.815*** 0.732*** 0.721*** 
  (0.140) (0.143) (0.146) (0.149) 
load_dum - 0.514** 0.486** 0.488* 0.486* 
  (0.183) (0.183) (0.197) (0.197) 
timing + -0.132 
 
-0.135 
 
  (0.135) 
 
(0.137) 
 
  2.933 3.658 1.942 1.882 
Controls  (13.16) (13.41) (14.19) (14.36) 
expr - 0.141 0.130 0.196* 0.173 
  (0.0915) (0.0926) (0.0991) (0.0994) 
turnr + 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.404*** 0.401*** 
  (0.0278) (0.0283) (0.0300) (0.0304) 
size + -0.449* -0.611** -0.465* -0.662** 
  (0.193) (0.215) (0.208) (0.234) 
flow - 11.07*** 11.06*** 10.94*** 10.96*** 
  (0.273) (0.277) (0.291) (0.294) 
cons  0.823*** 0.815*** 0.732*** 0.721*** 
  (0.140) (0.143) (0.146) (0.149) 
df_m  7 6 7 6 
Time FE  No Yes No Yes 
N   1843 1843 1631 1631 
 
